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Assessing the Impact of Stricter Food Safety Standards on Trade: HACCP in 
U.S. Seafood Trade with the Developing World 
 
Abstract: 
Health risks associated with seafood products prompted the introduction of mandatory HACCP 
in the seafood industry in the United States in 1997. This paper quantifies the trade impact of this 
introduction by analyzing patterns of seafood imports to the U.S. over the period 1990 to 2004. 
The  results  of  a  gravity  model  using  panel  data  suggest  that  HACCP  had  a  negative  and 
significant  impact  on  overall  seafood  imports  from  the  top  33  developing  and  developed 
countries  selling  into  the  U.S.  For  developing  countries,  the  results  support  the  view  of 
“standards-as-barriers”  versus  ”standards-as-catalysts”  as  the  negative  HACCP  effect  was 
experienced by developing countries, while the effect for developed countries was positive. 
 
1  Introduction 
The incidence of foodborne illness due to bacterial contamination has made concerns 
more widespread about food safety, the setting of stricter standards, and the means of enforcing 
mandatory regulations. Moreover, the potentially rapid spread of safety hazards through global 
trade has highlighted deficiencies in national food control systems in developed countries (GAO 
2005). These concerns have pushed countries to develop more effective food safety systems. 
From the point of view of many industrialized countries, the diversity of regulatory standards 
and  programs  across  countries  is  a  major  regulatory  challenge,  particularly  with  regard  to 
differences between developed and developing countries.   2 
For  the  United  States,  one  of  the  worlds’  largest  producers  and  importers  of  fishery 
products, the issue of seafood safety has been of particular concern. Approximately 15 percent of 
an estimated 76 million foodborne illnesses that occur every year in the U.S. are associated with 
seafood consumption (GAO 2001). The risks associated with domestic and imported products 
motivated the introduction of a mandatory Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) 
approach to food safety regulation in seafood processing in 1997. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) encourages member countries to harmonize national 
standards with the standards of the joint FAO and WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission. The 
agreement  permits  importing  countries  to  impose  measures  more  stringent  than  international 
standards  and  allows  measures  to  be  taken  to  limit  or  even  ban  imports  based  on  scientific 
justification.  In  the  United  States,  the  Food  and  Drug  Administration  (FDA)  is  assigned  to 
inspect  samples  of  imported  seafood  at  the  port  of  entry  and  refuses  adulterated  shipments. 
Although such systems are intended to prevent potential contamination risks from entering a 
country,  they  can  also  cause  an  unjustified  non-tariff  trade  barrier  that  protects  domestic 
industries. 
A potential hurdle arises in the international fishery products trade because seafood is 
primarily produced and exported by developing countries where sufficient food supply at low 
prices often ranks as a higher consideration than international food safety standards (Henson et 
al. 2000). With regard to seafood trade, and food trade in general, the conventional wisdom in 
the  literature  held  that  increased  food  safety  standards  in  developed  countries  amount  to 
“standards-as-barriers” to trade that are used as protectionist tools. This especially holds for the 
majority  of  mandatory  standards  under  the  SPS  Agreement  that  might  discriminate  against   3 
developing countries, especially if, contrary to the agreement, the effective level of enforcement 
is more rigorous for imports than for domestic supplies. On the other hand, a more recent and 
less pessimistic view of the role of food safety standards in trade emphasizes the opportunities 
provided by emerging requirements and the possibility that developing countries could use them 
to  increase  their  competitive  advantages.  This  “standards-as-catalysts”  view  argues  that 
compliance with new food standards may provide various incentives for countries to modernize 
their export-oriented sectors, as well as to strengthen the levels of food and health standards at 
the national level.  
We  contribute  to  this  discussion  by  investigating  the  impact  of  stricter  food  safety 
measures on U.S. seafood trade. Based on a gravity equation model of trade flow analysis, we 
investigate the impact on the seafood trade of mandatory HACCP measures introduced in 1997 
using data on imports to the U.S. by the 35 largest seafood exporting countries, of which 27 are 
developing countries and 8 are developed countries. The data set includes the pre-HACCP period 
of 1990 to 1997 and the post-HACCP period of 1998 to 2004. We test both the overall impact of 
HACCP on U.S. seafood imports and the whether there is a difference in the relative impact for 
developed and developing country exporters. This allows a direct empirical test of whether the 
“standards-as-barriers” or the ”standards-as-catalysts” view more closely fits the observed trade 
impacts.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on food safety 
with an emphasis on empirical studies that deal with the potential impact of increased food safety 
standards on international trade and the seafood market. Section 3 outlines recent developments 
in U.S. seafood trade followed by a discussion in Section 4 of the role of the HACCP system in 
the U.S. seafood industry and the implications of mandatory HACCP enforcement for developed   4 
and developing countries. Section 5 introduces the econometric gravity equation approach and its 
extension,  followed  by  the  description  of  the  panel  data  set.  Selected  results  of  the  random 
effects panel regressions are discussed in Section 6 followed by simulations of country specific 
impacts  of  HACCP  standards  on  seafood  trade.  The  final  section  includes  conclusions  and 
recommendations.  
 
2  Food Safety and Trade: Empirical Evidence 
In international trade theory, it is a well-established result that the trade policy of a large 
country can directly affect its own as well as other countries’ welfare by affecting trade flows 
through trade creation and trade redirection. There is now a fairly extensive literature on the 
effects of food safety standards and the SPS Agreement on developing countries. Most of this 
literature contains general assessments that indicate key issues [Henson et al. (2000), Buzby et 
al. (2004), Josling et al. (2004), World Bank (2005)]. 
In addition, Pinstrup-Andersen (2000), Unnevehr (2000, 2003), Jaffe and Henson (2004), 
Henson and Mittulah (2004), and Caswell and Bach (2005) have discussed the implications of 
major differences among food safety standards under the SPS Agreement from the point of view 
of developing countries. These authors agree that stricter national and international food safety 
measures  have  the  ability  to  amount  to  protectionist  non-tariff  barriers  to  trade  for  many 
developing  countries. However, Jaffee  and Henson (2004) and the World Bank  (2005) have 
highlighted  the  potential  opportunities  that  evolve  from  the  development  of  food  safety 
regulations and differences among importing countries. They suggest that these developments 
are  likely  to  increase  the  ability  of  certain  developing  countries  to  use  the  new  standards 
environment to their competitive advantage. However, both papers conclude that the gap has yet   5 
to be bridged between growing consumer and standards requirements in developed countries and 
modernized supply chain structures in many export oriented industries of developing countries. 
Jaffee  and  Henson  conclude  that  the  simple  black  and  white  argument  between  food-safety 
”standards as barriers” and ”standards as catalysts” is more complex in reality, requiring close 
analysis of impacts where particular markets, products, and countries are analyzed in order to 
understand  how  changing  food  safety  standards  provide  challenges  and  opportunities  for 
developing countries.  
Although  a  number  of  studies  recognize  the  relevance  of  food  safety  standards  with 
respect to international trade flows [Unnevehr and Jensen (1999), Hooker and Caswell (1999), 
Henson and Loader (1999), Henson et al. (2000), Unnevehr (2000), Garcia-Martinez and Poole 
(2004), Unnevehr and Roberts(2004), Henson and Mittulah (2004)], only a few studies in the 
economics literature have used empirical data to estimate the impact of national and international 
food safety regulations on trade flows. Among the quantitative studies of trade diversion and 
redirection effects resulting from food safety measures, Paarlberg and Lee (1998) and Calvin and 
Krissoff  (1998)  apply  partial  equilibrium  approaches  to  estimate  the  welfare  effects  of  food 
safety standards, assuming hypothetical relationships between food safety, demand, and supply 
conditions. Under simplifying assumptions, both papers show that phytosanitary barriers deterred 
trade and led to considerable rents due to the protection of domestic markets. 
Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh (2001) employ a gravity-equation model to estimate the 
impact of changes in European alfatoxin standards on African exports of cereals, dried fruits, and 
vegetables.  Wilson  and  Otsuki  (2004)  explore  the  impact  of  stricter  pesticide  standards  for 
bananas  on  trade  flows  between  developing  countries  and  OECD  importing  countries.  Their 
results suggest that the implementation of new aflatoxin and pesticide standards results in overall   6 
negative trade affects for developing countries. For example, Wilson and Otsuki report that a 1 
percent increase in regulatory stringency leads to a decrease in banana trade of 1.6 percent. More 
recently, Maskus et al. (2005) estimated the costs of compliance with product standards for firms 
in  developing  countries.  Based  on  firm  level  data  the  study  concluded  that  overall  costs  of 
standard compliance were non-trivial and could potentially constitute barriers to trade for firms 
thus reducing export success.  
Seafood products have attracted less attention. In the literature on the impacts of food 
safety regulations on international trade flows even though seafood consumption accounts for a 
disproportionately large share of foodborne illnesses in the United States (GAO 2001) and other 
OECD countries (Cato 1998). Martinez-Zaroso and Nowak-Lehmann (2004) explore the export 
potential  of  MECOSUR  countries  in  a  liberalized  EU  market.  This  issue  is  of  particular 
economic  importance  since  agricultural  and  fishery  products  make  up  about  2/5  of 
MERCOSUR's total exports to the EU. Applying a panel analysis technique the study reveals 
strong correlations between the overall level of EU market protectionism and the growth rate of 
MECOSUR exports. In particular, the category of fishery products faced high barriers to trade 
from EU protection.  
Among  the  few  studies  that  mainly  focus  on  safety  issues  for  fishery  products  in 
international trade, Alberini et al. (2005) explore the implications of FDA inspection of seafood 
imports under the HACCP regulation. Based on a theoretical model of enforcement, the authors 
econometrically rejected the hypothesis that the FDA performed targeted inspections based on 
actual HACCP requirements or past compliance of firms. However, the results reveal that a 
firm’s compliance strategy largely focuses on the threat of inspection of sanitary standards for 
seafood.   7 
Debaere (2005) investigates the impact of changing trade policies, in particular the EU 
zero tolerance policy of antibiotics, on the global shrimp market. The author shows empirically 
that  the  EU  policy,  mainly  the  loss  of  Thailand’s  preferential  status  in  the  EU,  enforced 
differences in international safety standards for shrimp leading to a disruption of trade flows 
from  Europe  towards  the  U.S.  Debaere  quantifies  the  size  of  the  trade  frictions  that  led  to 
significantly decreased U.S. shrimp prices and caused a U.S. anti-dumping case against six Asian 
shrimp exporting countries. However, the study is highly case specific and therefore does not 
directly  contribute  to  the  question  of  the  overall  trade  impact  emanating  from  food  safety 
standards in seafood trade.  
Peridy et al. (2005) apply a panel model to the analysis of the economic factors affecting 
seafood imports into France. Specifying the gravity equation at the disaggregate product level the 
authors develop insights into the economic determinants of French seafood imports. However, 
the influence of food safety standards is not central to the analysis, since the impact of trade 
barriers  is  reflected  in  a  very  broad  manner  that  does  not  account  for  the  effects  of  safety 
regulations with regard to seafood trade.  
In  summary,  the  empirical  evidence  on  the  implications  of  increased  food  safety 
standards  has  addressed  important  questions  that  contribute  to  the  understanding  of  whether 
standards act as barriers or catalysts to trade. However, the dichotomy of the impact of food 
safety standards is still largely unresolved with regard to international seafood trade. Much of the 
analysis of seafood HACCP requirements within the United States has focused on the national 
implications  of  food  safety  regulations.  Hence,  many  studies  have  concentrated  either  on 
explaining  the  principles  of  HACCP  and  its  implementation,  or  on  estimating  the  costs  and   8 
benefits arising from different technologies in the improvement of food safety
1. Therefore, to our 
knowledge  the  following  analysis  is  the  first  to  estimate  the  magnitude  of  trade  changes 
emerging from stricter food safety standards in the form of HACCP requirements for seafood 
implemented in the United States.  
 
3  U.S. Seafood Trade, International Food Safety, and HACCP  
Although the United States is one of the world’s largest exporters of seafood, its annual 
trade deficit in fishery products has been rising over the past 15 years. This deficit is the largest 
for any agricultural product and the second largest, after petroleum, for any natural resources 
product. Seafood from foreign countries is filling a growing share of the United States seafood 
market, as the expanding U.S. population and increasing awareness of the health benefits of 
seafood continue to promote consumer demand. Figure 1 shows the pattern experienced in the 
U.S. of rising imports and growing trade deficits. The annual growth rate in the trade deficit is 
estimated at 1.8 percent in the period 1990-2003. Starting from a deficit of $ 2.4 billion in 1990, 
the gap between exports and imports increased to a maximum of $ 7.8 billion in 2003.  
The U.S. supply of edible seafood has gone up steadily in recent years. However, by 
1998 imported seafood comprised 63 percent of consumption. The share of imports increased to 
68 percent in 2000 and reached a peak of 76 percent of edible seafood consumption in 2002. 
Import volume has increased from 1997-2004 for both developing and developed countries. This 
pattern can be attributed to very low or non-existent tariffs on most fishery product imports, 
where products are not available from national resources in sufficient quantities. Additionally, 
trade  restrictions  overall  have  lessened  due  to  on-going  WTO  negotiations.  This  trend  in 
increased  imports  has  been  also  been  supported  by  a  steady  increase  in  overall  seafood 
                                                 
1 Golan et al. (2004) provide a comprehensive review of food safety innovations in the United States.    9 
consumption in the United States, which has increased over 50 percent since 1980 and is still on 
the rise.  
As the U.S. seafood industry has come to rely more heavily on global resources to fill the 
gap between domestic seafood supply and growing demand, developing countries have remained 
important trading partners, with increasing volumes of sales into the U.S. market. Table 1 shows 
that 35 countries supplied approximately 95 percent of the U.S. import market from 1996 to 
2004  (BICO  2004)
2.  The  average  concentration  of  import  supply  shares  of  the  8  developed 
countries  was  27.5  percent,  while  the  leading  27  developing  countries  accounted  for 
approximately 67 percent of edible seafood imports into the United States. For nine consecutive 
years from 1996 to 2004, edible fishery product imports from developing economies were valued 
at approximately 2.5 to 2.8 times those from developed countries.  In  fact, “fish is the most 
important  food  product  exported  by  developing  countries  and  it  comes  well  before  coffee, 
bananas, and tea” according to FAO fisheries experts (FAO 1998). The net foreign exchange 
receipts derived from fish in developing countries increased from $11.6 billion in 1992 to $17.4 
billion in 2002, illustrating the active part played by the developing country group in trade of fish 
and fish products. In 2002, they accounted for more than 49 percent of the total worldwide value 
of seafood exports, with net export revenues estimated at $8.2 billion (FAO 2004). 
Food safety issues related to the international trade in fishery products are more complex 
than for other commodity markets due to a greater variety in harvest methods, production areas, 
and regional markets. These factors make seafood a highly non-homogenous product. However, 
there seems to be no direct empirical evidence that imported seafood has higher food safety risks 
                                                 
2  The  35  countries  include  8  developed  countries  (Canada,  Iceland,  Japan,  Norway,  New  Zealand,  Australia, 
Denmark  and  United  Kingdom)  and  27  developing  countries  (Argentina,  Bahamas,  Bangladesh,  Brazil,  Chile, 
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela 
and Vietnam).   10 
per  se.  On  the  other  hand,  there  oftentimes  is  a  lack  of  reliable  information  on  safety 
characteristics compared to domestic products, as emphasized by Pinstrup-Andersen (2000) and 
Donovan et al. (2001)
3. 
In 1997, a mandatory HACCP requirement replaced the prior regulatory system for the 
seafood industry in the United States. At the time of its implementation, HACCP was seen as a 
win-win proposition although companies had to incur costs for HACCP plan design, additional 
control  and  record  keeping  procedures,  additional  sanitation  procedures,  and  training  of 
employees  (Colatore  and  Caswell,  2000).  FDA  has  acknowledged  that  the  introduction  of 
HACCP has proven to be complex, as many elements were largely unfamiliar to most domestic 
processors but also to processors in major exporting countries. Unnevehr (2000) points out that 
HACCP systems vary widely among developed countries and discusses the controversy about 
their use as public sector concepts for food safety regulation. HACCP standards may pose an 
additional  significant  hurdle  to  seafood  suppliers  above  and  beyond  their  current  quality 
assurance systems. At the same time, the growing and diverse adoption of mandatory HACCP 
programs by governments means that it is an SPS measure that may affect international trade in a 
non-negligible way.  
We hypothesize that the introduction of mandatory HACCP has had a significant effect 
on seafood trade flows into the United States. For example, developing country exporters may 
have chosen to export to other countries rather than the U.S. because of increased compliance 
costs for the U.S. market, which deprive them of their comparative trade advantage. The World 
Bank (2005) has estimated that the costs of food safety interventions in export-oriented seafood 
industries in developing countries are becoming significant for those who attempt to penetrate 
                                                 
3 According to the FDA, 80 percent of domestic food-manufacturing facilities are found to be in compliance with 
HACCP requirements, while some 30 percent of inspected foreign facilities have significant system defects (GAO 
2001).   11 
high-income food markets. Moreover, U.S. importers may choose not to buy from developing 
countries as safety levels may be lower overall, be harder to verify, and involve greater risks of 
failure to comply with safety standards when inspections are made at the port of entry. On the 
other hand, countries that have relatively high food safety standards themselves or that meet U.S. 
HACCP requirements may be able to increase their export volume at the expense of others and 
gain an increased competitive advantage.  
We test whether the data in the case of mandatory HACCP adoption in the U.S. supports 
the “standards-as-barriers” or “standards-as-catalysts” views of the trade impact on exporting 
developing  countries.  To  quantify  the  effects  of  mandatory  HACCP  requirements  on  an 
individual country level is difficult and has largely been explored to date via case studies [Swann 
et al. (1996), Donovan et al. (2001), Otsuki et al. (2001a)]. However, looking at this particular 
impact  from  a  more  multilateral  point  of  view  using  available  panel  data  is  increasingly 
important given the new trade agenda.  
 
5  The Panel Model Approach to Analysis of HACCP Trade Impacts 
Different methodological approaches have been applied to disentangle the complicated 
trade effects of food safety standards. Maskus et al. (2001) summarized alternative approaches to 
estimating the impact of standards on trade. We apply an econometric panel approach to quantify 
the effects of mandatory HACCP requirements on U.S. seafood trade (Hsiao 1986). As discussed 
earlier, the studies of Paarlberg and Lee (1998) and Calvin and Krissoff (1998) applied partial 
equilibrium  approaches  to  analyze  the  demand,  supply,  and  welfare  effects  of  food  safety 
standards.    12 
Previous studies by Swann et al. (1996), van Beers and van den Bergh (1997), Peridy et 
al.  (2000)  and  Wilson  and  Otsuki  (2004)  discuss  the  advantages  of  econometric  methods, 
especially the  gravity  equation approach, for the analysis of standards  in international trade. 
Evenett and Keller (1998) supply evidence of the accuracy of the gravity equation in predicting 
various theoretical trade models as the equation can be derived from Ricardo, Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson, or increasing return to scale models (Bergstrand 1989).  
A  major  advantage  of  an  econometric  approach  based  on  the  gravity  equation  is  the 
ability to examine relationships that are most relevant for international seafood trade between 
policy variables and determinants of bilateral trade flows, such  as tariff and non-tariff trade 
barriers; transport costs, proxied by the geographical distance between trade partners; exchange 
rates; or the size of the importing and exporting economies. Moreover, the econometric approach 
does not predetermine the direction of the effect of standards and other trade determinants; thus 
it can be used for hypothesis testing. It also allows the direct estimation of elasticities of trade 
flows with regard to food safety standards and other determinants. Additionally, the panel nature 
of the data set allows the investigation of differing effects of stricter safety standard measures 
across countries.  
The  model  we  specify  is  a  variant  of  the  classic  gravity  equation  of  bilateral  trade 
analysis. It includes the size of each exporting country’s seafood sector introduced as a measure 
of “mass”, geographical distances to the U.S., foreign exchange rates, and the size of the U.S. 
economy.  In  addition,  we  introduce  a  policy  variable  for  the  implementation  of  mandatory 
HACCP in the U.S. to explicitly account for the impact of this safety standard on trade. The 
model includes variables that explore the effects of international trade agreements on seafood   13 
trade flows into the United States. The dependent variables are quantitative import volumes and 
monetary values of seafood imports into the U.S.  
The specification of the gravity model is:  
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All variables are in logarithm so the coefficients represent elasticities. Imports
x
it denotes 
the imports of seafood from country i to the United States in a particular year t. Superscript x 
stands for  either the volume of imports  (Imports
Q
it) or the dollar value of imported seafood 
(Imports
$
it). These data were obtained from the Fisheries Statistics & Economics Division of the 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS 2005, 2005a) for the years 1990 and 2004. Table 2 
presents definitions and descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. Trade 
data for Korea and Vietnam where incomplete and were dropped form the data set. The panel-
data set covers 33 countries in the period of 1990 to 2004. 
Time  has  the  value  1  to  14  for  the  14  years  of  observations.  HACCP  reflects  the 
implementation  and  enforcement  of  HACCP  requirements  by  the  FDA  effective  in  1998. 
Consequently this dummy variable equals one for the years 1998 to 2004 and is zero in previous 
years. GDP, as a proxy of income, is the real per capita GDP of the United States in 2000 U.S. 
dollars. Size is a proxy for the importance of international seafood trade in each country and was 
computed by adding up the quantities of aggregate seafood imports and exports. Seafood trade 
data are available online from the FAO’s database “fishstat plus” (FAO 2005). Alternatively, the 
export value of total goods and services of each country is measured by Export and may also be 
used as a proxy of trade activity. Exchange is the market exchange rate between the U.S. dollar   14 
and the domestic currency of each exporting country, while Distance measures the geographical 
distance in miles between each country and the United States. 
Develop is a dummy variable reflecting development status. It equals one for the eight 
developed  countries  and  is  zero  for  the  twenty-five  developing  countries.  To  account  for 
international trade agreements that could affect seafood trade with the U.S., the dummy variables 
MERCOSUR,  NAFTA,  ASEAN,  APEC  and  ANDEN  are  set  equal  to  one  when  the  country 
belongs to a particular trade agreement. Geo is a classification variable, indicating geographical 
connection between seafood exporters and the United States. As we could not identify clear 
colonial ties for the United States this variable has three levels: Trade relations with Asian and 
Pacific countries are captured in Geo1, while the group of South American countries is included 
in Geo2, and Northern countries make up the Geo3 group
4. The hypotheses on the signs of the 
first derivatives of the model variables are:  
∑ Imports/∑ HACCP < 0; ∑ Imports/∑ GDPpc > 0; ∑ Imports/∑ Size > 0;  
∑ Imports/∑ Distance < 0; ∑ Imports/∑ Export > 0; ∑ Imports/∑ Developed > 0; 
∑ Imports/∑ Exchange > 0.  
We hypothesize that adoption of the HACCP standard has had a negative impact on U.S. 
seafood imports. In addition, we hypothesize a positive sign for the variable Developed since 
developed countries among the seafood exporters to the U.S. are expected to already enforce 
higher  food  safety  standards  and  to  face  lower  barriers  to  comply  with  U.S.  food  safety 
requirements. The impact of geographical distance is assumed to be negative, while the size of 
the  exporting  countries  economy  Exports,  the  developing  status  Developed  and  the  foreign 
exchange rate to the U.S. Dollar Exchange are hypothesized to have a positive sign. All other 
                                                 
4 South Africa is the only African seafood exporting country in the data set. Instead of creating an additional country group, South 
Africa is included in the Asia/Pacific country group.   15 
signs  are  ambiguous;  there  exist  differential  hypotheses  on  the  influence  of  time,  trade 
agreements, and geographical connection.  
 
6  Empirical Analysis of HACCP Effects on Seafood Trade 
Our primary interest is  in the magnitude and significance of the trade  flow effect of 
HACCP requirements on U.S. seafood trade. Therefore the panel of fishery product import data 
is estimated across 33 fishery product exporting countries for the time period 1990-2004. In 
order to examine the importance and robustness of a number of model coefficients, the general 
gravity equation (1) is estimated in alternative specifications for the two dependent variables of 
quantitative import volumes and dollar values of seafood imports into the United States. In order 
to  account  for  major  differences  in  the  effects  of  HACCP  on  developed  and  developing 
countries, and therefore explicitly test the “standards as barriers” versus “standards as catalyst” 
hypotheses, separate regressions are performed on the subgroups of developed and developing 
countries.  
Model 2 is the general specification of the gravity equation including the trade flow effect 
of mandatory HACCP requirements on seafood trade. The core variables of the gravity equation 
are the “mass” of the importing country (GDPpc), the size of the exporting country’s seafood 
sector (Size), exchange rate (Exchange), the geographical distance (Distance) and a time trend 
(Time), This model in both specifications of the dependent variable is the benchmark for all other 
specifications.  
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Model 3 adds the effect of international trade agreements on seafood imports into the 
U.S. Moreover, the variable Developed allows us to test whether there is a significant difference 
between  the  groups  of  developed  and  developing  countries,  directly  testing  the  effects  of 
development status on seafood trade before and after HACCP implementation.  
i ) ANDEN ( 12 ) APEC ( 11 ) ASEAN ( 10 ) NAFTA ( 9
) MERCOSUR ( 8 ) Developed ( 7 ) it ce tan Dis ln( 6 ) it Exchange ln( 5
) it Size ln( 4 ) t GDPpc ln( 3 ) t HACCP ( 2 ) Time ( 1 0
x
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+ + + +
+ + + + + =
(3) 
Model 4 substitutes for the variable Size, reflecting the importance of each country’s 
seafood sector, with a broader definition. Here the value of a country’s total export of goods and 
services, Export, is used as a proxy for “country size”. Furthermore the variables Geo1 and Geo2 
represent  an  alternative  specification  of  country  specific  effects  on  seafood  trade  previously 
represented  by  trade  agreement  variables.  Geo1  includes  Latin  American  fishery  product 
exporters to the U.S. and Geo2 covers the Asian-Pacific country group. 
i ) 2 Geo ( 9 ) 1 Geo ( 8 ) Developed ( 7 ) it ce tan Dis ln( 6 ) it Exchange ln( 5
) it Export ln( 4 ) t GDPpc ln( 3 ) t HACCP ( 2 ) Time ( 1 0
x
it ports Im ln
e a a a a a
a a a a a
+ + + + +
+ + + + + =
(4) 
The  panel  nature  of  the  data  may  introduce  heterogeneity  biases,  so  that  appropriate 
econometric methods are required to separate the time series and cross-sectional effects. The 
initial ordinary least square estimates revealed significant serial correlation. We therefore applied 
Exact Maximum Likelihood estimators (ExactML) to random effects models. The parameter 
estimates are corrected for first-order serial correlation of the residuals and stationarity of the 
times series properties is imposed (Beach and MacKinnon 1978). Given the large number of 
country-pair  relations  in  the  data  set,  we  treat  the  corresponding  country  specific  effects  as 
random.   17 
The  choice  of  the  estimation  procedure  is  motivated  by  different  factors.  First,  fixed 
effect models cannot be estimated with variables that are time and product invariant, such as 
geographical distance. Random effects models are more appropriate given the importance of this 
gravity variable in our model. There are good reasons for arguing that country-specific fixed 
effects come to the fore especially when stricter food standards may boost or hamper trade flows 
across countries. Of course, such factors are deterministically linked with individual country 
specifics, which may not be considered as random. However, the studies of Otsuki et al. (2001), 
Wilson and Otsuki (2004) and Blind and Jungmittag (2005) apply fixed effects models. On the 
other hand, two recent studies doubt the appropriateness of the use of fixed effects models in 
trade flow analysis, especially when time invariant geographical distance variables are included 
in the gravity equation, which is the most prominent example. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) and 
Peridy et al. (2000) among others point out that a fixed effects estimator will wipe out all time 
invariant variation. Maddala (1987) provides another argument. Random effects models should 
be favored as many degrees of freedom are saved when the number of individuals (countries in 
our model) is greater compared to the number of periods.  
The gravity model estimates are presented in the following order. First, Models 1a-3a are 
run over all available observations for the dependent variable of dollar value of imported seafood 
(Imports
$
it). Models 1b to 3b are then similarly regressed on the volumes of imported seafood 
(Imports
Q
it). The results appear in the columns of Table 3. Second, regressions are run separately 
for the country groups of developed and developing countries. Elasticities of HACCP effects for 
the entire period 1998-2003 are reported in Table 4.  
The results for the aggregate imports of seafood products into the Unites States indicate 
that the random effects estimates of the gravity models are generally well behaved. The double-  18 
log  specifications  reveal  the  best  parameter  estimates  in  all models  and  allow  for  the  direct 
interpretation of coefficient elasticities. Due to insignificant results the variable MERCOSUR has 
been dropped from specifications (2a) and (2b). Our findings are very interesting with respect to 
a number of influencing factors with regard to the limited number of empirical studies that have 
estimated the effects of food-safety standards on international trade flows,  
We begin with the discussion of the estimates of the benchmark models 1a and 1b and 
compare  the  results  to  the  extended  and  alternative  model  specifications.  The  previously 
addressed positive time trend in seafood imports into the United States is significantly confirmed 
with respect to both the values and quantities of seafood. The estimated elasticities are 0.04 and 
0.03 in the benchmark models, while the alternative specifications show only slightly varying 
time trends. This finding is also confirmed by positive and significant elasticities of real per-
capita gross-domestic product, as a proxy of U.S. per-capita seafood demand. The estimates are 
robust across specifications with elasticities around 0.6 and 0.5 in the benchmark models, while 
the estimates are of smaller magnitude in all other specifications.  
The geographical distance variable in model 1a shows a theoretically plausible negative 
effect on seafood trade. The elasticity of -0.215 is highly significant with regard to the dollar 
value of imported seafood. Interestingly, the volume of seafood imports in equation 1b does not 
reflect the impact of geographical distance. While models 3a and 3b reveal significant elasticities 
of the magnitude of -0.65 percent to -0.79 percent, in models 2a and 2b the distance effect is 
captured mainly by the effect trade agreements or country groups had on seafood trade with the 
U.S. Peridy et al. (2000) report a significant distance elasticity of -0.742 for seafood imports into 
France. Disdier and Head (2005), who perform a meta-analysis of 1467 distance effect estimates 
in gravity models, report a mean elasticity value of -0.9.    19 
Our panel regressions also highlight the significance of the “mass” variable (Size) as a 
major factor in explaining trade flows. The importance of each country’s seafood sector, in terms 
of  imports  and  exports,  has  a  significant  and  positive  effect  on  its  ability  to  penetrate 
international high-income markets for fishery products such as the U.S. The elasticity estimates 
across model specifications are robust with parameter values in the benchmark specifications of 
0.397. This trade facilitating effect is confirmed by the alternative specification using the dollar 
value of total exports in goods and services (Export) as a proxy of export orientation in models 
3a and 3b. The elasticity estimates are 0.33 and 0.29, respectively.  
Interestingly, an expected negative effect of the foreign exchange rate to the U.S. dollar 
on seafood imports is only observed in models 2a and 2b. The elasticity estimates state that U.S. 
seafood imports increased by around 0.065 percent due to a 1 percent increase in the market 
exchange  rate  to  the  US  dollar.  However,  compared  to  the  exchange  rate  elasticity  of  0.97 
reported by Martínez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann (2004) for seafood exports by MERCOSUR 
countries, the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on U.S. seafood trade is marginal. Peridy et 
al.  (2000)  report  a  nominal  exchange  rate  elasticity  of  -0.54.  In  investigating  the  impact  of 
European  safety  standards  on  African  food  commodity  exports,  Otsuki  et  al.  (2001)  did  not 
include an exchange-rate variable in their panel analysis. 
Unlike  the  more  general  specification  of  gravity  equations  in  models  1a  and  1b,  the 
alternative specifications in models 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are extension that additionally account for 
various factors that may impact seafood trade flows. To the best of our knowledge this study is 
the first to explore the effects of trade agreements and geographical connections among fishery 
nations on seafood trade flows. Our results clearly indicate that these factors are of importance in 
explaining trade flows. For both dependent variables the results reveal significant positive effects   20 
of  relevant  trade  agreements.  With  regard  to  U.S.  seafood  imports  the  NAFTA  free  trade 
agreement has the greatest impact with elasticities around 1.3 and 1.5.  
The fact that developing countries account for almost 75 percent of U.S. seafood imports 
is evident in the statistical results of the model. The negative sign of the variable Developed 
indicates a negative impact on seafood trade of increased development status. Interestingly, the 
magnitudes  of  the  effect  are  greatest  for  absolute  trade  volumes.  Moreover,  the  impact  of 
geographical connections shows that Latin-American countries (Geo1) have better access overall 
to  the  U.S.  seafood  market  compared  to  the  residual  group  of  northern  countries,  which  is 
dominated  by  European  fishery  nations.  In  contrast  the  group  of  Asian  andPacific  countries 
(Geo2) does seem to have a competitive disadvantage compared to European competitors as 
indicated by a significant negative estimate.  
Coming  to  the  core  emphasis  of  the  paper,  Table  3  shows  that  the  introduction  of 
mandatory HACCP in the processed seafood market in the U.S. had a significantly negative 
effect on trade flows across all exporting countries. The estimated elasticities in the benchmark 
specifications of models 1a and 1b are -0.61 and -0.47, respectively, indicating that the HACCP 
standard  posed  a  significant  trade  barrier  to  seafood  import  supply.  However,  under  the 
enforcement of HACCP, U.S. seafood imports declined differently, depending upon whether 
absolute monetary values or volumes of imported seafood are considered. Table 3 shows that the 
overall effect on the values of seafood imports was greater then on the quantities of seafood 
imports.  However,  the  HACCP  variable  is  of  the  expected  sign  but  insignificant  in  both 
specifications of model 3. Comparing our findings with previous estimates on the impact of 
food-safety standards on trade flows, Otsuki et al. (2001) found a negative impact of stricter EU 
aflatoxin standards on cereal exports and particularly on fruits, nuts and vegetable exports by   21 
African countries into the EU. The elasticity estimate is -1.075 for the category of cereals and  
-0.433 for fruits, nuts and vegetable exports. With regard to the introduction of a new pesticide 
standard  by  the  EU,  Wilson  and  Wilson  and  Otsuki  (2004)  estimate  a  significant  negative 
elasticity effect of this safety standard on EU banana imports. The gravity equation panel model 
on seafood trade of Peridy et al. (2000) shows a significantly negative impact of trade barriers on 
aggregate as well as product specific seafood imports into France. However, the presented trade-
barriers elasticity for the period of 1988-1994 of -0.012 is rather marginal.  
With regard to the dichotomy of HACCP as “standards-as-barriers” or  “standards-as-
catalysts”  to  trade,  our  results  support  the  hypothesis  of  an  overall  negative  impact  of  the 
introduction of the HACCP standard on seafood imports into the U.S. Previous studies did not 
fully exploit panel data to test for country-specific effects, specifically with regard to the impact 
of food-safety standards on export flows from developing versus developed countries. To test for 
differential effects the panel dataset is divided between developed and developing economies 
with  separate  panel  regressions  of  all  models.  The  estimates  of  HACCP  elasticities  on  U.S. 
seafood imports from developing and developed countries are reported in Table 4, together with 
the previously found aggregate HACCP standard elasticities (total).  
The  point  elasticities  of  the  HACCP  trade  flow  effects  for  the  group  of  developing 
countries is consistently negative and significant. Parameter values indicate declining trade flows 
of 0.64 percent to 0.75 percent from developing country seafood exporters to the U.S. in the post 
1998 period. Furthermore, Table 4 shows significant opposite HACCP effects for the group of 
developed  countries.  In  the  aftermath  of  the  introduction  of  HACCP,  seafood  exports  from 
developed countries increased significantly by 0.27 percent to 0.64 percent depending on the 
model specification.    22 
With regard to the dichotomy of “standards-as-barriers” versus “standards as catalysts,” 
our results give a remarkably clear answer. While the group of developing countries suffered 
trade losses due to stricter standards in the United States, developed countries, many of them 
European economies, significantly increased their export shares in terms of quantitative volumes 
as well as the value of seafood shipments. This finding underlines the importance of disaggregate 
analysis of the trade flow effects of standards, particularly when non-homogenous groups of 
developed and developing countries are considered. Jaffee and Henson (2004), who address this 
issue in detail, conclude that with a few exceptions where developing countries faced major 
restrictions  from  new  food  safety  standards  that  developing  countries  have  managed  to  use 
higher standards successfully to position themselves in a competitive global market. In contrast 
our  findings  strongly  reject  this  finding.  For  the  case  of  seafood,  the  “standards-as-barriers” 
hypothesis is more favored.  
 
7  Conclusions 
Foodborne safety risks associated with domestic and imported seafood products motivated the 
introduction of a mandatory HACCP for seafood products in the U.S. in 1997. From the point of 
view of the U.S. and other developed countries, regulatory standards are intended to reduce 
potential  contamination  risks.  However,  they  can  also  create  non-tariff  trade  barriers.  The 
conventional wisdom is that increased food safety standards in developed countries amount to 
“standards-as-barriers”,  particularly  for  developing  countries.  An  alternative  view  sees  the 
potential  for  “standards-as-catalysts,”  as  developing  countries  react  to  new  standards  with 
increased investment in quality assurance.   23 
This  paper  contributes  to  this  discussion  by  estimating  the  trade  impact  of  the  1997 
introduction of HACCP in the U.S for domestic and imported seafood imports. We apply panel-
data on seafood imports to the U.S. by the 33 largest exporting countries between 1990 and 
2004. Twenty-six of these countries are developing, while 8 are developed. The results of an 
extended  specification  of  the  gravity  model  indicate  a  significantly  negative  impact  of  the 
HACCP standard on U.S. seafood imports across the 33 exporting countries. The results are 
robust  in  terms  of  absolute  trade  volumes  and  product  values.  The  direct  empirical  test  of 
whether the “standards-as-barriers” or the “standards-as-catalysts” view more closely fits the 
observed  trade  impacts  strongly  confirms  the  “standards-as-barriers”  hypothesis.  While 
developing countries suffered significant trade reductions under HACCP, developed countries 
gained market share under HACCP. 
The results emphasize the importance of quantitative economic modeling to inform the 
discussion  of  the  role  of  food  safety  standards  as  non-tariff  barriers  in  international  trade. 
Economic analysis of the trade effects of increased food safety measures can also be useful in the 
development of more effective food safety systems, in particular by developed countries. An area 
of future research and extension of the analysis is the investigation of HACCP effects at the 
individual  country  level.  These  results  could  be  used  to  capture  the  welfare  implications  of 
international food safety measures on individual developing countries.  
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Table 1: Concentration of Import Supply Shares of U.S. Seafood 1996-2004 
1996  1997  1998  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Import Concentration Ratios  
(% of total) 
8 Developed Countries  27.3  26.9  27.0  27.4  28.4  28.7  27.4  26.7 
27 Developing Countries  66.3  67.3  67.4  67.5  65.0  65.4  67.7  68.6 
Leading 35 Suppliers  93.6  94.2  94.4  94.9  93.4  93.1  95.1  95.3 
Source: BICO Reports, 1996-2004.   32 
Table 2:  Definitions of Variables and Sample Statistics 






Annual volume of imported seafood into the United 




Value of annual seafood imports into the United States by 
country i (Million US Dollars)  216.37  343.70 
Independent Variables 
Time   Trend 1990-2004  8.27  4.67 
HACCP  Introduction and enforcement of mandatory HACCP 
standards in U.S. seafood (1998-2004 = 1)   0.47  0.50 
GDPpc  Real per-capita U.S. GDP (1000 US $)  29.53  7.01 
Size  Total volume seafood imports and exports of country i  
(Million metric tons)  1.43  1.51 
Export  Export value of total goods and services of country i  
(Billion US Dollars)  60.58  95.05 
Distance  Geographical distance between country i and the U.S. 
(Thousand Miles)  4.92  2.97 
Exchange  Real exchange rate between US$ and domestic currency i  
(value of one dollar in terms of domestic currency i)   697.50  2706.34 
Developed  Development status of country i  
(developed economy = 1)   0.27  0.44 
Geo 
Geographical connection between fishery exporting 
countries (Latin America = 1; Asia/Pacific = 2; Northern 
= 3) 
1.76  0.73 
MERCOSUR  Dummy variable for MERCOSUR member countries: 
Argentina, Brazil  0.06  0.24 
NAFTA  Dummy variable for NAFTA members countries: 
Mexico, Canada  0.061  0.24 
ASEAN  Dummy variable for ASEAN member countries: 
Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand  0.12  0.32 
APEC 
Dummy variable for APEC member countries: Australia, 
Canada, Chile, China, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Thailand 
0.42  0.49 
ANDEN  Dummy variable for ANDEN member countries: 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela  0.12  0.32 
   33 
Table 3: Gravity  Model  Estimates  of  HACCP  Impacts  on  U.S.  Seafood  Imports  1990-
2004
a,b 
Random Effect Panel Estimation for U.S. Seafood Trade               (fully robust standard errors) 
  Dependent variable: Dollar Value of 
Imported Seafood 
Dependent variable: Volume of Imported 
Seafood 





























































































Export      0.331
*** 
(7.69) 
    0.294
*** 
(5.87) 











NAFTA    1.459
*** 
(4.36) 




ASEAN    0.497
*** 
(2.62) 




APEC    0.583
*** 
(3.14) 




ANDEN    0.605
*** 
(2.78) 




GEO1       1.036
*** 
(4.26) 
    1.148
*** 
(3.96) 
GEO2      -0.569
** 
(-2.38) 
    -0.470
* 
(-1.67) 
Rho   0.88  0.88  0.89  0.86  0.87  0.88 
DW  1.76  1.79  1.83  1.89  1.91  1.94 
Adj. R
2  0.76  0.80  0.76  0.74  0.77  0.72 
No.  492  492  492  492  492  492 
F  20.07  19.19  26.82  17.26  15.40  24.9 
a t-statistics (in parentheses) computed with White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
b Random effect estimates corrected for first-order serial autocorrelation.  
***, ** and * statistically significant at the 99%-, 95%-and 90%-level, respectively. 
Critical F value computed according to Leamer (1978, p.114).   34 
Table 4: Elasticities of HACCP effects for developed and developing countries 
a 
HACCP Elasticity 
Dollar Value of U.S. seafood imports   Volume of U.S. seafood imports  Group 









































a ExactML random effect estimates of elasticities corrected for serial correlation. t-statistics (in parentheses) 
computed with White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
***, 
** and 
* statistically significant at the 99%-, 95%-and 90%-level, respectively. 